SURVIVAL OF THE FITTEST? THE REBRANDING OF WEST VIRGINIA HIGHER EDUCATION

EXCERPT: CHAPTER SIX: RECRUITMENT AND THE COLLEGE-TO-UNIVERSITY CHANGE

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CHAPTER SIX: RECRUITMENT AND THE COLLEGE-TO-UNIVERSITY CHANGE

While the law [of competition] may be sometimes hard for the individual, it is best for the race, because it ensures the survival of the fittest in every department. – Andrew Carnegie (1889).

Students who apply but do not enroll are sending a message about your competition. – Robert Sevier (2002b).

While the rebranding of West Virginia institutions is the main thrust of this study, this particular chapter analyzes enrollment trends at a number of institutions in the United States. By using quantitative data, this chapter examines the effect on enrollment after a “college-to-university” name change, the impact of independent variables upon enrollment, and the relationship between these variables. Schools were surveyed on the topic of the significance of enrollment as a justification for a specific name change, the importance the school placed upon enrollment regarding the overall success of the change, and whether enrollment increased or decreased as a result of the name change. Two independent variables that produced negative enrollment figures were analyzed. Interviews and historical data provided examples and perceptions of the change’s effect upon an institution’s enrollment activities at West Virginia’s regionally accredited institutions.

From 1996 to 2005, 151 regionally accredited colleges rebranded as universities. Eight of those institutions were located within West Virginia. While the reasons for these changes could vary from institution to institution, these transitions ultimately changed each school’s image and character. Whether the institution’s motives are obvious in changing its image or not, nevertheless, the new name is a new brand. Shampeny (2003) speculated that such branding changes are market driven: “With the increasing cost of college tuition, the competition for students, and, in the case of state colleges and universities, decreasing state funding, colleges are continually looking for ways to attract
students, fund their mission and stand out from the crowd” (¶ 5). Increased competition among public, private, and proprietary institutions for students has fueled the impression that “U.S. higher education is the most market-oriented system in the world” (Dill, 2003, p. 137).

Do such changes affect the recruiting of students? In some cases, enrollment increases have occurred. Following the rechristening of New Hampshire’s Plymouth State College as Plymouth State University in 2002, administrators credited the change as being the catalyst that helped the school double its graduate enrollment (Vaznis, 2007). One year after Beaver College became Arcadia University, enrollments increased by 20%, and applications rose nearly 34% (Lowrey, 2002). When the 13 colleges in the Georgia system changed to universities, chancellor Stephen R. Portch expressed optimism that “the name changes will help the 13 institutions attract students and help graduates find jobs” (Lively, 1997, p. A33). Koku (1997) indicated that often the argument for a strategic name change has been that the change will boost enrollments and to correct an overall loss in student population.

While the tactic has worked for some schools, the “college-to-university” name change is not a guarantee that enrollment will increase for every school that becomes a “university.” Koku (1997) set out to determine if higher educational strategic name changes have the same effect upon enrollment that were produced in business as documented by Horsky and Swyngedouw (1987). Rau, Patel, Osobov, Khorana, and Cooper (2003) also documented that even the slightest change in a business name had positive results on its stock prices.
Koku (1997) examined enrollment trends at 140 institutions that experienced a strategic name change between the years 1978 to 1988. To accomplish this, Koku tracked incremental changes of enrollment. By comparing the mean incremental change for the five years prior to the change to the mean incremental change for five years after the change, Koku concluded that there was no statistical significance in enrollment changes after a strategic name change. Even though no statistical significance was calculated, Koku noted that some schools had produced a significant change in enrollment. Overall, the change of an institution’s name had little effect on enrollment.

“College-to-University” Rebranding and Institutional Enrollment

Although Koku (1997) analyzed various types of strategic institutional name changes, he did not discriminate solely upon the basis of the category of “college-to-university” rebranding. In addition, Koku’s 11 years of enrollment data were not consistent. While his sample contained 140 schools, the number of schools analyzed from year to year varied from 113 to 139 with the average being 132.9. Koku’s method took the mean incremental enrollment changes by subtracting the previous year from the more recent year and computing the mean of the changes. He next took the means of five years prior to the change and then means of five years following the change and conducted a two sample mean test. Koku failed to reject his hypothesis that “The name change strategy is not effective in increasing student enrollment in colleges and universities” (p. 60).

While Koku (1997) looked at numerous types of strategic name changes of educational institutions, it was useful to replicate his study using a population of institutions that had only “college-to-university” name changes. Since this particular
study deals primarily with such changes from the years of 1996 to 2005, it was necessary to eliminate those years wherein a full five years of data were not available. Therefore, the entire population of this part of the study were limited to all 103 schools (see Appendix AD) that transitioned to university status between 1996 and 2001.

While Koku did not identify the sources of enrollment data, this researcher originally sought to use data from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System or IPEDS. Unfortunately, there were years that the IPEDS data were inconsistent. During one year, head count was reported, while in a subsequent year, Full Time Equivalency (FTE) data were reported. During some years, both head count and FTE data were collected. In addition, no reports were filed for the Fall 1999. In order to achieve consistency, this researcher tracked fall FTE that schools reported to the Higher Education Publications’ *HEP Higher Education Directory*. Directories from 1992 to 2007 provided the enrollment data (Rodenhouse, 1992-2002; Burke, 2003-2007).

Koku eliminated all medical schools and institutions that did not offer baccalaureate degrees. No distinction, however, was made in the population of schools that were included in this study. All higher education institutions named as a college, institute, or school prior to the adoption of the university moniker were examined. This included schools that adopted the name by virtue of a merger into another institution or system. In cases where some proprietary schools extended their reach beyond their original campus through merger and/or acquisition (e.g., Argosy University and Colorado Technical University), only the enrollment of the original campus was tracked.

The *HEP Higher Education Directories* proved to be consistent with data missing for only one school (the Graduate School of America, now Capella University) for the
fourth and fifth year before the name change. Enrollments were not reported, as the
school was not accredited during these two years. Overall, 99.8% of the enrollment data
from the total population was collected. Koku collected 94.9% of enrollment figures for
his sample of 140 schools. As with Koku’s study, “to correct for size bias, we
calculate[d] the incremental change in enrollment for each school instead of the absolute
change in enrollment” (1997, p. 62).

Using Koku’s (1997, p. 62) model and formula, incremental enrollment changes
were calculated in the following manner:

\[ \delta E\alpha = \frac{(E_i - E_{i-1})}{(E_{i-1})} \]

where,

- \( \delta E \) = incremental change in enrollment.
- \( \alpha = 1 \) to 103 (any of the 103 schools of the population)
- \( E \) = enrollment
- \( i = \) time from t–5 to t+5 (five years before the name change to five years
  after the name change).

An institution’s mean incremental change was calculated for both the pre-change years
and post-change years. Appendices AE-AI provide enrollment data, incremental change
data, and mean incremental changes for all 103 schools.

The pre-change mean incremental enrollments were compared to post-change
mean incremental enrollments via a paired samples test with an \( \alpha \) of .05%. A paired
samples test was conducted on the 103 schools utilizing SPSS (Statistical Package for the
Social Sciences) statistical analysis software. The difference between pre “college-to-university” name change incremental enrollments and post “college-to-university” name change incremental enrollments suggests that there is an enrollment advantage to colleges that transition to universities. There also is a strong positive correlation of .608 between the pre and post variables (see Appendix AJ). While this positive correlation exists, there was a lower mean score for the post-change results. The mean rate of pre-change incremental enrollment was 0.0693 and the mean rate of post-change increment enrollment slowed to 0.0412. The mean difference between the two was -0.0281. While this will be discussed further, it is not an indication of a loss of enrollment, but rather an indication that enrollment growth had slowed.

While the significance of the post-change scores differs from Koku’s conclusion, the outcomes may be similar. While growth occurred, the post-change percentage of growth was at a lower rate. While Koku indicated that no significance existed in the rate of growth at institutions making a strategic name change, the “college-to-university” change produced significant negative growth percentages. It must also be noted that Koku’s study addressed all types of strategic name changes during the years 1978-1988. The differences may have occurred because of the earlier years of his study and that he did not specifically address the “college-to-university” change. The reason for slower growth may not be related to the change to university status and may be a result of the economy or other factors.

**Institutional Size**

Both Koku (1997) and Morphew (2000), who specifically analyzed “college-to-university” name changes based on institutional selectivity, revealed that the majority of
institutions in their studies were smaller colleges; both indicated that there was a perceived benefit for these schools to change names. The smallest of the 103 schools had an FTE enrollment (during the name change year) of 363. The largest school in the study was 12,100. *U.S. News & World Report’s “America’s Best Colleges”* (2007) ranks college and university size as a) small: less than 2,000; b) medium: 2,000 – 4,999; c) large: 5,000 – 9,999; and d) very large: 10,000 and above. Of the 103 institutions, 50 (48.54%) were small institutions (see Figure 6.1).

Figure 6.1
*Study institutions by size.*

A majority of the institutions making a “college-to-university” change were small and medium schools. This is consistent with Koku’s findings that “smaller regional schools are more likely, than the bigger schools, to use [a] strategic name change strategy” (1997, p. 67). Spencer (2005) identified 52% of his sample of institutions changing name from 1992 – 2001 as having enrollments of fewer than 2,500 students.
While there is no indication that selectivity and size correlate, Morphew (2000) claimed that “less selective institutions are much more likely than their peers to change their names from college-to-university” (p. 16).

With so many small institutions using the “college-to-university” name change strategy, institutional size may contribute to overall enrollment success when a change occurs. To test the independent variable of size, paired sample tests were conducted on the pre-change and post-change incremental enrollment data for three categories. The small and medium categories included 50 and 37 institutions respectively. Since only one very large institution was represented (Kennesaw State University), it was included with the 15 large institutions in one category (see Figure 6.1).

For each of the three categories, the pre-change mean incremental enrollment was compared to mean post-change incremental enrollment in a paired samples test with an $\alpha$ of .05%. In two of the classifications (small and larger), there was no significant statistical difference between enrollments before an after a name change (see Appendix AJ). While smaller institutions produced no statistically significant difference between pre-and post-change enrollment numbers, larger schools generated even less significant results between the pre and post “college-to-university” name change enrollments. Only one size category indicated a significant difference between pre-and post-event enrollments. Medium sized schools have a greater probability of experiencing an enrollment change (see Appendix AJ).

In addition, all categories indicated a lower post-change mean. Medium sized schools, however, suffered the greatest disparity between pre-and post-name change mean incremental enrollments. Larger schools experienced the least amount of negative change.
(see Table 6.1). The numbers do not necessarily represent a loss in enrollment, but rather the average amount of growth (or loss) from year to year. While growth was occurring overall, it was not occurring at the same rate as prior to the name change process.

Table 6.1
Pre-and post-change mean incremental enrollment compared by school size.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre &amp; Post Name Change Mean Incremental Enrollments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pre-Change</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larger</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The rate of slower incremental growth and a continuing overall growth in enrollment can be illustrated by Rowan University, formerly Rowan College of New Jersey. Rowan University’s pre-change mean incremental enrollment was 0.0259 and its post-change mean incremental enrollment rate was lower at 0.0122. Rowan’s overall enrollment, however, grew during the 11-year period. Five years prior to the name change, Rowan had an FTE enrollment of 8,316. During 1997, the year of the name change, Rowan had an enrollment of 9,213 FTE students. Five years following the change, Rowan reported an FTE of 9,788. While the rate of growth slowed, the institution continued on an upward trend. Rowan experienced a 10.79% growth in enrollment during the year of the name change over five years previous; however, its growth from the name change year to five years later slowed to 6.24%. Overall, Rowan had a growth of 17.7% for the entire period.

While a larger institution size may have a slight advantage regarding enrollment growth rates, there was no significant difference between pre-change and post-change years. Where there was a significant difference with medium school enrollments, this category experienced a greater negative change than the other two categories. Therefore,
there is no indication that the independent variable of an institution’s size directly related to any change in enrollment after a “college-to-university” name change.

**Institutional Type**

The *HEP Higher Education Directories* additionally provide the type of each accredited educational institution indicated by its level of control. These are categorized as follows: a) “state,” or commonly referred to as “public”; b) independent, non-profit, which is commonly referred as “private”; c) under specific various denominational or other religious designations; and d) “proprietary.” Other designations are used but are not germane to this study. While collating these data, this researcher discovered a quasi-fifth category – schools that reported their control as “independent, non-profit,” but either are under the control of a religious body or are faith-based institutions that has no direct relationship to any one specific religious denomination, conference, or fellowship.

Eight schools represent the former subgroup, while two schools represent the latter (see Appendix AK). Since these schools reported that they were independent, they were considered as such. In addition, two schools changed how their level of control was reported during the 11-year period. Cornerstone University, originally listed as a Regular Baptist college, is now listed as being “independent, non-profit.” Baylor College of Dentistry was an “independent, non-profit” institution and was acquired by the State of Texas prior to its name change to Texas A&M University – Baylor College of Dentistry.

For the purpose of this study, institutional types were based on how the school was reported during the year of the change. Faith-based institutions that reported a denomination, conference, or fellowship as the controlling body were simply listed as
“religious.” A list (of the respective religious bodies including specific Roman Catholic orders that control these institutions) is provided in Appendix AK. Figure 6.2 shows the distribution of the various types of schools in the study.

Figure 6.2
*Study institutions by type.*

A paired samples test on each of the four major categories determined that post-change enrollment was not statistically significant based on institutional type (see Appendix AJ). While religious institutions had the lowest p-value, the value of .079, this was determined not as not being significant at an $\alpha$ of .05. The least amount of significance occurred with proprietary institutions; however, these for-profit institutions had the greatest correlation between pre-and post-change incremental enrollment figures. While all schools experienced growth in enrollment, two-thirds of proprietary schools had slowed rates of growth – some of these were considerably lower than before the name
change. The reasons for this are not known; however, there may be the possibility that branch campus sites were reporting their own enrollments in the years following the name change. In past years, branch campus enrollments may have been computed with the main campus numbers. Only main campus enrollment figures were used in this study. Public and private institutions showed no statistical significance. Therefore, the independent variable of institutional type appears to have little or no effect upon an institution’s enrollment following a “college-to-university” name change.

**Type of Change**

Tadelis (1997) suggested that one of the most powerful intangible assets that a business can have is its name. Therefore, the name choice is very important in creating an image. Horsky and Swyngedouw (1987) indicated that when businesses change names, it is often associated with a positive change in stock pricing. Rau et al. (2003) signified that even a minor name change produced greater stock prices. Koku (1997) concluded that higher education institutions should resist the temptation of utilizing proven business tactics in regard to strategic name changes. Koku found no significance in enrollment following a strategic name change; however, an analysis of the 103 “college-to-university” changes from 1996-2001 indicated a statistically significant difference in incremental enrollment – albeit the growth in enrollment had slowed. This raises the question of whether the type of name change had any impact upon the slowing of enrollment.

Rau et al. (2003) identified two types of changes – minor and major. When reviewing the various names that institutions had selected, three types of changes emerged: minor change – simple; minor change – more complex; and major change. The
category “minor change – simple” encompasses institutions that simply replaced the word “college” with “university.” Examples of “minor change – simple” institutions are Elon College to Elon University, Kentucky Christian College to Kentucky Christian University, and Park College to Park University.

Institutions identified as having “minor change – more complex” change kept their primary names in tandem with other modifications. These modifications included adding “university” along with additional words, having a rearranged word order, eliminating certain words, or producing a merged identity. Some illustrations of “minor change – complex” are Saint Francis College to University of St. Francis, Armstrong College to Armstrong Atlantic State University, and Marylhurst College of Lifelong Learning to Marylhurst University. These institutions kept their basic identities; however, the name change was more complex than simply replacing the word “college” with “university.”

A major change involves a complete retooling of the institution’s name. Schools in this category included the following: Rosary College to Dominican University, Pacific Christian College to Hope International University, and Suomi College to Finlandia University. Additionally, four institutions changed names due to a merger with other institutions. These included three that had a “minor change – more complex”: Baylor College of Dentistry to Texas A&M University – Baylor College of Dentistry, Union Institute to Union Institute and University, and West Virginia Institute of Technology to West Virginia University Institute of Technology (WVU Tech). One additional merged institution completely changed its identity with a major change: Ricks College to Brigham Young University – Idaho.
The vast majority of institutions (51) were “minor change – simple.” These schools merely replaced the appellation “college” with “university.” Thirty-seven experienced more intricate rebranding as “minor change – more complex.” Only 15 institutions completely changed identities from their former names (see Figure 6.3).

A paired samples test in each of the categories determined that post-change enrollment was statistically significant based only on one institutional type. Institutions experiencing a “minor change – simple” comprised the only category that experienced a statistically significant difference. Incremental changes from this category were determined to be significant at an $\alpha$ of .05 (see Appendix AJ). Unfortunately, 31 of the 51
schools lost enrollment and the paired samples test indicated that there was a slight negative correlation. From all appearances, these schools experienced negative growth following the “college-to-university” change. The change may have not been influential in the loss of enrollment (see Appendix AJ).

While the “minor change – simple” institutions exhibited a significant change in post-name change enrollment (albeit it was a negative effect), neither of the two additional categories indicated a positive or negative significance in regard to enrollment. Institutions that experienced a more complex minor change and those with a major name change indicated no statistical significance (see Appendix AJ). Therefore, the more complex the type of change, there was an indication that it produced a minimal effect upon an institution’s enrollment following a “college-to-university” name change.

In addition, the independent variables for the 103 schools were tested to see if any relationship existed between or among any of the variable combinations. These variables included the following: institutional size, type of name change, institutional control, and Carnegie Classification. These categories were compared to each other using the non-parametric Chi-Square test. None of the six different combinations indicated a significance at the .05 level. SPSS Chi-Square data for these combinations is found in Appendix AL.

In order to perform a Chi-Square test on enrollment data, the difference between the post-change incremental enrollments and pre-change incremental enrollment was calculated and categorized. Seven categories of enrollment were arbitrarily constructed. These categories and their parameters are as follows: a) Major loss, -10.01% and greater; b) Moderate loss, -5.01% to -10.00%; c) Minor loss, -2.01% to -5.00%; d) Flat
enrollment, -2.00% to +2.00%; e) Minor gain, +2.01% to +5.00%; f) Moderate gain, +5.01% to +10.00%; and g) Major gain, +10.01% and above. The enrollment data were compared to institutional size, institutional control, type of change, and Carnegie Classifications. None of the variable combinations indicated a significance at the .05 level. SPSS Chi-Square output for these data is found in Appendix AL.

**Enrollment as a Rationale for and Result of the “College-to-University” Change**

While incremental enrollment figures can be important in determining the effectiveness of a “college-to-university” name change, these data are inferential at best. More specific data regarding the importance of enrollment as both a reason to change and a result of the change can be helpful in determining its importance in the overall scheme of the change. Since this study ultimately deals with “college-to-university” changes at West Virginia institutions, it was necessary to collect data from a similar population. Since West Virginia is the only state that lies completely within the Appalachian Regional Commission’s definition of Appalachia, it was determined to look at similar changes at 51 schools within and surrounding Appalachia.

The sample area included the following 10-state region that included Appalachian designated counties: Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. Two additional states with Appalachian counties, New York and Mississippi, were omitted because there were no qualifying institutions during the years 1996 to 2005. Because only 12 institutions in the Appalachian counties of this 10-state region rebranded as a “university,” it was necessary to survey administrators at rebranded universities in non-Appalachian counties as well.
The university presidents were asked to provide information on their specific institutional changes and, if they were not institutional employees at the time of the change, to designate another administrator who would act as a proxy. Of the 51 surveyed institutions, 34 or nearly 67% participated.

Three specific questions resulted in answers that dealt with enrollment:  a) “Since changing name and status can be multifaceted, please rank the major compelling reasons for the change of name to a university”; b) “Please rank the five top reasons the name change can be perceived as successful”; and a Likert scale statement, c) “Enrollments increased as a result of the name change.” The first question included as one of the choices, “to increase enrollment.” One of the choices on the second question was “increased enrollment.”

The results of the first two questions were scored by assigning the most important choice assigned with 5 points, the second most important choice 4 points, and so forth. This allowed for scores to be generated for answers. Since participants were able to add their own responses, this often created a list where similar items were somewhat differently represented. To compensate for 30 answers on the first question, similar topic areas were grouped into major categories. The Likert scale used for the third question was based on the following four points: “strongly agree,” “agree,” “disagree,” and “strongly disagree.” Nine Likert scale questions were asked in total (see Appendix S).

**Enrollment as a Rationale for the Change**

As a motive to make the change, increased enrollment ranked high at number four; however, this category had a score much lower than the top three choices and less than
half the responses than the number one criterion (see Table 6.2). While fourth place indicates some importance in the scheme of reasons, fewer than half of the responding institutions indicated that enrollment had any importance in the decision to become a university. Only one school indicated that the enrollment was the primary reason for the change. Most responses indicated that enrollment was a tertiary reason for the university change (see Table 6.3).

Table 6.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Points</th>
<th>Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Reflect Current Status</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Define Future Mission</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Institutional Prestige</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Enrollment</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>International Reputation</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.3

Reason of “enrollment increases” given by sample schools for becoming universities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason Rank</th>
<th>Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Most important reason</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second most important reason</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third most important reason</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth most important reason</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth most important reason</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Enrollment as an Indicator of a Successful Change

While seeking to increase enrollment was less often cited as a reason to become a university, it was frequently used as an indicator of the institution’s overall success (see Figure 6.4). Increased applications, hits to the institutional web site, and enrollment scored 72 points with 21 total responses. Of the 21 responses, two institutions indicated that an increase in enrollment was the number one indicator of the change’s success (see Table 6.4). Of these two schools, only one indicated that enrollment was a reason for the
name change; however, this institution listed enrollment as the fifth most important reason. Six schools referenced the criterion as the second most important indicator of the change’s success. Of the institutions that listed enrollment-related issues as methods to gauge their success, seven institutions did not indicate that enrollment was the primary reason for the change. In addition, only one school rated “increased enrollment” as the primary motivation in the “college-to-university” rebrand. This particular institution indicated that the strategy did not produce successful results.

Figure 6.4
Basis of the success of the “college-to-university” change.

Table 6.4
Enrollment as an indicator of success as given by responding schools.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason Rank</th>
<th>Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Most important reason</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Second most important reason</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third most important reason</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth most important reason</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth most important reason</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Enrollment Growth Credited to the Change

Of the sample institutions, 70.6% of the respondents agreed (14) or strongly agreed (10) that their institutions increased in enrollment following the “college-to-university” change (see Figure 6.5). Ten institutions reported that there was no positive change in enrollment, with five institutions that disagreed and five institutions that strongly disagreed to the statement, “Enrollments increased as a result of the name change.” While a majority of institutions indicated enrollment growth, this indicator ranked the lowest of the nine Likert scale questions with a mean score of 2.85.

Figure 6.5
The institution increased in enrollment (as related to the change).

Enrollments Increased

While slightly fewer than half of the institutions considered an increase in enrollment as one of the reasons to seek university status, the majority of institutions indicated positive enrollment results following the change. This is consistent with the
findings regarding incremental enrollment changes of 103 American rebranded universities between 1996 and 2001. While the results are consistent, some schools had only one or two years of enrollment data available after the change to make a judgment. Of the 34 responding institutions, three rebranded in 2004 and five in 2005. The data provided by these institutions would not be considered longitudinal. In addition, several changes occurred among the sample institutions. One of the responding schools further changed its name nine years after the “college-to-university” change. Another institution, exactly one year after the adoption of the university name, merged with another and completely changed identity. One institution that adopted the university designation by absorbing another school is now in the process of divesting itself of its adopted daughter institution which prompted the name change.

**Enrollment in Relation to Other Variables**

Since growth in enrollment generally accompanies the adoption of a “university” designation, does a correlation exist between enrollment and other variables? Several other variables were compared to enrollment following the university change and were analyzed with a Pearson bivariate correlation coefficient using the SPSS statistical software package. The responses of the 34 administrators were tested for correlation with eight other variables. During the interview process, administrators revealed a number of additional variables as affecting enrollment following the name change.

**Reported Data**

Variables were tabulated along with enrollment data of 103 schools that underwent a “college-to-university” change from 1996 to 2001. These data included
incremental tuition changes, the number of pre-and post-change graduate degrees and
certificates, and pre-and post-change Carnegie Commission classification changes. The
incremental tuition was computed using the same method that Koku (1997) employed for
enrollment. Tuition figures were gathered from the HEP Higher Education Directories
and the mean incremental change in enrollment was computed for the five years prior to
the name change to the five years following the change. The difference of the mean post-
change enrollment minus the mean pre-change enrollment was compared to the difference
of the post-change tuition minus the pre-change tuition. There was no statistical
correlation between enrollment and tuition following the name change.

The researcher collected data from institutional catalogs and archived web sites to
determine the number and type of graduate programs offered during the year of the
change and for five years following the change. Graduate programs were enumerated and
ranked along the hierarchy used by National Center of Education Statistics (NCES, 2005)
of the U.S. Department of Education. The number of programs were segregated by type
and were multiplied by the NCES rank levels. These levels included the following
categories: a) post bachelor’s graduate certificates – level 6; b) master’s degrees – level
7; c) post master’s certificates and intermediate degrees (Ed.S., C.Phil, and M.Phil.) –
level 8; d) research doctorates – level 9; e) first professional degrees – level 10; and f)
post-professional certificates – level 11 (NCES, 2005).

A rank was established for the institution’s graduate programs for the year of the
change and for the fifth year following of the change. The difference of the more recent
number minus the year of the change was compared to the difference in enrollment data.
There was no correlation between enrollment and number/rank of graduate programs
following the change. In regard to an increase in the number of graduate programs, 75 institutions had growth in this area, 19 had no change, and nine actually experienced a loss of programs. Of the 75 that experienced growth, two experienced only the slightest of growth comparable to moving a certificate program to the master’s degree level, three added graduate certificate programs, and 14 added one master’s program or a master’s program and the upgrade of a certificate program to the master’s level. Only nine institutions experienced a large addition of graduate programs weighted between 103 points (2 graduate certificates and 13 master’s degrees) and 326 points (five graduate certificates, 41 master’s degrees, and one research doctorate).

Table 6.5  
*Correlation of enrollment and other variables for population of institutions 1996-2001.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incremental Changes in Tuition</td>
<td>0.972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes in Graduate Degrees/Certificates</td>
<td>0.848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes in Carnegie Classification</td>
<td>0.775</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data regarding the institutions’ Carnegie Classifications were charted according to the numerical systems used by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching (2004, 2006). The period encompassed three different classification schemas: 1994, 2000, and 2005. The 2000 classification categories were used as the basis. The major differences between the three categories were in the classifications of doctoral and/or research universities. Since only three institutions were in any of these categories, they were regarded as not changing since the classifications could not be equated across all three numbering systems.

The 2005 categories had a different numbering system than the 1994 and 2000 classifications; however, since the classification names were very similar to the 2000
grouping, the 2000 numbers were applied to the 2005 categories. Carnegie Classification numbers were tabulated for the year of the change and for the fifth year following the change. The difference between the two numbers was compared to the difference in enrollment. No correlation was determined as occurring between the two variables. See Table 6.5 for the significance levels and Appendix AM for the SPSS output table.

**Collected Data**

At the onset of this study, 51 presidents of institutions that experienced a “college-to-university” name change in the region surrounding Appalachia were invited to participate. Three successive mailings produce a return of 67.66% of the surveys, which represented 34 institutions. The administrators or their proxies were asked to rate specific statements on a 4-point Likert scale. Scores on this scale were computed as 4 = Strongly Agree, 3 = Agree, 2 = Disagree, and 1 = Strongly Disagree. Administrators rated nine statements according to this scale. Seven of these showed no correlation with the statement “Enrollment increased following the name change,” and did not produce a p greater than an α of .05 (see Table 6.6). See Appendix AC for the complete SPSS output tables.

Table 6.6
*Correlation of enrollment and other variables for sample institutions 1996-2005.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Faculty Supported the Change</td>
<td>0.422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alumni Supported the Change</td>
<td>0.499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration Supported the Change</td>
<td>0.236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Supported the Change</td>
<td>0.590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Supported the Change</td>
<td>0.560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Increase in Institutional Prestige</td>
<td>0.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Institution Exhibits University Culture</td>
<td>0.912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Increase in Graduate Programs</td>
<td><strong>0.025</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Only one variable correlated to enrollment using Pearson’s correlation coefficient and that was the statement: “Since being named as a university, the institution has increased the number of regionally accredited graduate and/or professional degree programs.” The results of this analysis (r(34,34) = 0.025, p < 0.05) indicated a significance. This analysis, however, produced different results than the previously reported data of an actual count and ranking of graduate degrees and certificates.

There are several reasons why this disparity of results may have occurred. Possible explanations are as follows: a) the respondent perceived that the institution experienced a greater programmatic growth than actually occurred; b) since a longer period was measured for some institutions (10 years for the 1996 institutions), a greater growth may have occurred after five years; c) this sample of institutions actually performed better than the general population; d) the percentage of schools without graduate programs was higher in the population (10 out of 103 or 9.71%) than in the sample (1 out of 34 or 2.94%); e) the 103 schools might have reported only undergraduate and not graduate FTE; f) unknown variables attributed to these different results; or g) an error in reporting occurred.

Additionally, 75 (73%) of the 103 institutions had experienced graduate program growth despite there being no correlation with incremental enrollment changes. Eighty-two percent (28) of the sample institutions indicated an increase in graduate programs. The mean score for this variable was 3.06 on a four point scale. As an indicator of the change’s success, the sample institutions placed less emphasis on the programmatic variable than other variables. The variables of “clarified identity,” “enhanced reputation,” and “enrollment increases” were all ranked higher as indicators of success.
Revealed Data

Interviews of two Georgia and 14 West Virginia administrators indicated two factors not directly related to the change that actually inhibited enrollment at rebranded public institutions. In both states, decisions made beyond the institutional level had serious consequences upon enrollment at certain universities. Additionally, these institutions were powerless in controlling the implementation of these mandated factors. This loss of control can have consequences as one administrator observed:

The loss of control of your own destiny – I will tell you in a lot of change literature, and I read a lot about leadership, the people who were leading organizations rarely have stress in change because they get to pick where the change is . . . As long as it is on my campus, I’m controlling the change and there’s no stress. When it is imposed by the legislature, I have stress because I didn’t pick the right place – that’s not the place I would have chosen to change.

The following data is a synthesis of personal interviews, comments from institutional surveys, and written documentation from the various schools, systems, and political entities.

Georgia and the semester system. In June 1996, the University System of Georgia Board of Regents approved that the nomenclature “State University” should be added to all the institutions in the System that have both an undergraduate and a master’s degree mission.” One survey respondent explained the process:
The Board of Regents (BOR), University System of Georgia began to study mission development and review policy direction in December 1994. Mission statements of all 34 systems schools were analyzed. In October 1995, the (BOR) Board of Regents and its committee on nomenclature and identity reported names of senior and two-year colleges in GA were not consistent with national patterns.

Eventually, 13 institutions adopted the name “university” by the end of the year. While the name change agenda produced problems at some institutions, another statewide initiative to move all 34 public institutions from the quarter system to the semester system during the fall 1998 added a tremendous burden on all schools in the system.

Like the nomenclature adjustment, Chancellor Stephen Portch originated the semester system change. As one administrator reminisced, “It was a mess; and in a lot of people’s minds those two events [the name and semester system changes] are compressed; and because the change from quarter to semester system was so traumatic . . . it was a bureaucratic nightmare; it was a record keeping nightmare; students hated it. The chancellor was driving it because he said that ‘the rest of the world is on the semester system, and we will be too.’” Another administrator added,

My personal bias is that it was absolutely unnecessary. He [Portch] used some justifications like – semester system schools finish earlier in the Spring than quarter system schools do. And semester system school students have a leg up on job opportunities and things like that. He cited some research that showed that learning under the semester system might
be better under certain conditions than learning under the quarter system.

But there’s also research that shows the other as well.

Some institutions had an easier time making this switch than others. One administrator who led the charge to implement the change at his institution observed,

Actually, with the students, there was a little confusion – but we did a great deal of PR with the students and we provided them with just a massive amount of information. We did a real good job of informing academic advisors of potential problems and making sure that students were advised well . . . We had a policy . . . and I think it was a good one. If we were going to err, we would err in the favor of the student. When a student got into a bind with something where he took a semester system course that wasn’t quite in line with what he should have done, we let him have it. We didn’t do any wholesale kind of massive things that would be considered doctoring of degrees . . . but if a kid had been in line to graduate and was making normal progress and the actual conversion itself caused a student a problem, then we figured a way to err and benefit the student than to benefit the policy. With that kind of mentality, it made things a lot easier.

In addition to students, faculty had to adjust to the new system. This required the retooling of all programs and classes. One administrator explained that faculty had issues with the change: “[There was] a lot of whining there. Some of it justified, some of it not. Many problems, especially with the sciences, trying to realign a year’s worth of courses
taught in three terms now converted into two terms. It was quite difficult [and] there was quite a bit of work.”

Some departments were more adept at moving to the new system. “I think the sciences and the mathematics departments took a systematic approach and did a very strong job with their conversions, but because of the fact they had to, in order to make their courses work.” Other departments adapted over time. The actual conversion did not occur overnight; as one administrator recalled, “we had three years where kids had both semester system and quarter system credits on their transcripts before we got through the cycle of a having a freshman class that was completely under the semester system.”

Table 6.7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Loss/Gain</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albany State University</td>
<td>-32</td>
<td>-0.99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armstrong Atlantic State University</td>
<td>-180</td>
<td>-3.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augusta State University</td>
<td>-193</td>
<td>-3.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clayton College &amp; State University</td>
<td>-440</td>
<td>-9.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbus State University</td>
<td>-283</td>
<td>-5.24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Valley State University</td>
<td>-162</td>
<td>-5.69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia College and State University</td>
<td>-345</td>
<td>-6.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia Southwestern State University</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>5.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kennesaw State University</td>
<td>-233</td>
<td>-1.78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Georgia College and State University</td>
<td>-295</td>
<td>-8.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savannah State University</td>
<td>-462</td>
<td>-16.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Polytechnic State University</td>
<td>-241</td>
<td>-6.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State University of West Georgia</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>2.80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The semester system change was an independent variable that affected an institution’s ability to gauge the impact the university change had upon enrollment. According to one administrator, “if at the time we were going to see a positive impact from the name change of the institution, we went from quarters to semesters and took a giant step backward. So I can’t attribute growth or decline to the name change because
of this other variable that just blew it out of the water.” When comparing the enrollment figures from 1998 to 1997 of the 13 institutions that became universities, all but two lost students (see Table 6.7).

While it may be coincidental, State University of West Georgia (SUWG) dropped its undergraduate acceptance criteria from “less selective” to “least selective.” This was the only year SUWG had this level of selectivity (U.S. News, 2000). Although their growth percentage was lower than Georgia Southwestern State University, the school gained more individual students than any of the other 12 rebranded universities during the 1998-1999 school year.

The quarter-to-semester system change appears to have negatively affected enrollment and will be linked to the name change process. One administrator recalled, “Because that was so traumatic and it happened in such temporal proximity to the name change, people sort of lumped them together in their heads as one negative swirl. And a higher education environment is not known for its love of change.” Another administrator added, “We went through a lot of work for not very much gain at all.”

West Virginia and community college independence. Over the past several decades, certain West Virginia public institutions began creating component community colleges to meet the growing needs of vocational and technical education of for their constituent populations. While three freestanding community colleges were developed in 1971 from branch campuses established in the 1960s by WVU, Marshall, and West Liberty, a series of component community colleges were established as divisions on the main campuses of certain state colleges in the 1960s and 1970s. Some schools, such as
Glenville State and Bluefield State, set up centers in other towns distant from their main campuses but located within their primary areas of service.

The component community college system allowed the state to utilize an existing infrastructure and create institutional divisions different from most other states. One administrator explained, “I don’t know of any state that operates its community college system out of its four-year institution. It’s not a model I’m familiar with and it may be unique in the country. I think invariably either one level, the two-year level or the four-year level, or both [levels] will suffer . . . because neither will have a clear sense of identity. People will have them confused – the institution could become schizophrenic over its real mission.”

While there is no question that community and technical college education was necessary for regional economic growth, there is no clear sense that the model was successful. One administrator added, “We got into this kind of a system way back when. Of all the states that ought to have a strong independent autonomous community college system, it’s West Virginia. We could have been preparing people with associate degrees with job related skills in workforce development; [however,] . . . just being tied to the four-year colleges, they [the community colleges] were practically invisible. Nobody even thought about them.”

As early as 1989, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching recommended that all of the state’s community colleges become freestanding institutions (Hoblitzell, 2000). Senate Bill 547 in 1995 called for changes at the component community colleges that included the following: a slight change in name with the addition of the word “technical,” a separation of the component institution’s budget, and
a new expedited degree approval process. In 1999, the legislature commissioned the National Center for Higher Education Management Systems (NCHEMS) to perform a study regarding a number of issues including community college education. The study found that “West Virginia was losing the race in the new economy, and state public higher education institutions were seen as having failed to provide access to the community college and graduate programs now seen as necessary for economic survival” (Hoblitzell, 2000, p. 7).

In 2000, SB 653 called for the establishment of independent, accredited, freestanding community and technical colleges in each of the regions in the state. One new school, Eastern WV CTC, was established at this time. Furthermore, SB 653 stated that “the Legislature recognizes that a system of independently-accredited community and technical colleges is essential to the economic vitality of the state” (2000, §18B-1A-5(3)). The independent CTCs were to emerge from the existing component colleges. By 2001, SB 703 called for the establishment of the West Virginia Council for Community and Technical College Education (WVCCTCE) as the governing body of community college education in the state. In addition, SB 703 initiated several processes to allow the component community and technical colleges (CTC) to emerge as independently accredited institutions over the next six years. While originally a division of the Higher Education Policy Commission, Senate Bill 448 (2004) authorized the WVCCTCE to emerge from the HEPC as a separate entity with its own chancellor.

Although SB 653 (2000) called for state funding, it did not occur. One administrator explained that [it was] “purely economic. What happened was . . . an NCHEMS study that said yeah, you should have your own community college system
and you should expend $170 million to get it going, and really the legislature forgot about the money. So, they tried to set up a community college system with no money.” SB 448 (2004), the “university name change bill,” also included additional definitions of the independently accredited, administratively linked community colleges.

When it came eventually for the institutions to be approved of their new “university” names, certain legislators required a quid pro quo for passage. One administrator recalled, “[It was a] typical political process, I mean, there was lots of horse trading. I think that if I remember correctly that this separation of the community colleges was part of the process. If we fought too hard on separating the community colleges, then they [the legislature] wouldn’t change our names.” Bluefield State College was the only school to protest the signing of SB 448 because they feared losing their stronger associate’s programs to New River CTC. Hoping to generate action against SB 448, a caravan of over 150 Bluefield State’s supporters rallied at the Capitol rotunda on April 1, 2004 (“Bluefield supporters,” 2004). Reading between the lines, it appears that the legislature punished Bluefield as a result of their protest. When the exact wording of SB 448 was edited and submitted for the governor’s signature, there was a provision for the remaining state colleges to achieve university status. Glenville and West Liberty were identified, but Bluefield State College was the only four-year school excluded from this specific proviso (SB 448, 2004).

With the CTC separation, all of the new universities except Concord were directly affected. In addition, West Virginia University Institute of Technology, Marshall University, Bluefield State College, and Glenville State College all lost their component CTCs. In most cases, the CTC remained administratively linked to its parent institution.
Glenville State’s CTC was split between Fairmont State CTC and the newly created New River CTC (which is currently administratively linked to Bluefield State).

The creation of new institutions created a series of problems that included a complete loss of enrollment that was originally attributed to the parent institution but now was now credited to the individual CTC (see Table 6.8). In some cases this loss of enrollment had a negative impact upon income, as one administrator explained: “There were a few people who said that this change was revenue neutral, but it resulted in an unintended consequence.” Because of the CTC separation, two schools lost portions of Title III funding as Historically Black Colleges and Universities. This specific funding was tied to institutional enrollment. With the inability to claim the CTC students, one administrator reported, “West Virginia State University lost $729,000 while Bluefield State College lost $1.3 million.” In both cases, the administratively linked CTCs were ineligible for this funding because they were founded after 1965. Therefore, over $2 million in federal appropriations that could have aided WV schools were lost.

Table 6.8
*CTC Parent Institutions FTE and CTC FTE.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARENT SCHOOL</th>
<th>2004 Parent FTE</th>
<th>2004 CTC FTE</th>
<th>CTC FTE % of WHOLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fairmont State University</td>
<td>3,668</td>
<td>2,396</td>
<td>39.51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shepherd University</td>
<td>3,183</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>17.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Virginia State University</td>
<td>2,649</td>
<td>1,147</td>
<td>30.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WVU Institute of Technology</td>
<td>1,363</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>29.63%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, state appropriations for some community colleges have been more generous than for the four-year institutions. By comparing the proposed fiscal year 2008 budget with FTE enrollments for Fall 2006, the greatest per student appropriation is at Eastern West Virginia Community and Technical College. While Eastern WV CTC is
scheduled to receive the lowest amount of funding at $1,990,948.00, it receives the most dollars per student with an appropriation of $7,319.66 (Manchin, 2007a; WVHPEC, 2006). The per student appropriation at Eastern WV CTC has decreased each year as enrollments have increased. In 2003, the school received $19,320 per FTE student (Manchin, 2007c).

While the funding for most CTCs is below that for their affiliated four-year institutions, two CTCs will have the larger FY 2008 appropriation. Pierpont CTC, now a division of Fairmont State, will receive $4,016.77 per FTE student while Fairmont State University has the lowest four-year appropriation in the state at $2,904 per FTE student. Only two institutions are lower than Fairmont: West Virginia State CTC and Blue Ridge CTC. New River CTC also has a larger appropriation than its affiliated parent. While New River is budgeted at $4,056.77 per FTE student, Bluefield State College has an appropriation of $3,355.43 (Manchin, 2007a & WVHPEC, 2006). One administrator observed, “New River, for example, is funded significantly better than its former parent institution, Bluefield State. New River has play money. They have money to do some new things.”

The CTC independence produced different reactions at the various campuses. One administrator observed,

I think it plays out differently in different parts of the state. I think that if you look at Glenville State’s stance now, they’re funded at a level that is significantly above West Virginia University. They have fewer students, but they have more money to serve fewer students. You look at Bluefield
State, they have less money to serve the same amount of students. So, the institutions that want the community college affiliated with them really have the political clout to keep them there. Fairmont State got its back . . . Shepherd didn’t want theirs – I think they had something of an ambition to be a pure four-year institution they look more like they want to be . . . I think we’ve got the resources in West Virginia now, and our community colleges have the resources to be catalyzed. And frankly, it is probably in the interest of some of the four-year institutions to give up some of their marginal students to the community colleges.

Some institutions, however, experienced problems because of the separation. Fairmont State University and Fairmont State CTC learned that students were having difficulty with federal financial aid. One administrator explained, “For instance, if you transferred mid-year between one and the other, your financial aid had to be recalculated. If you transferred, you couldn’t get your financial aid on the first day of the semester. You had to wait a month or six weeks before you could get it. The whole thing was becoming very complicated and potentially very expensive . . . So it [the reunification] was purely pragmatic in an attempt to avoid problems for our students.”

In addition to financial aid issues, the separation of the institutions required the schools to spend additional funds on accreditation, distinct libraries, and software licensing (Byrd, 2006; SB 792, 2006). The practicality of reuniting the schools was felt beyond the Fairmont State campus. One of the sponsors of SB 792 (2006), Senator Mike Oliverio, stated, “We believe Fairmont State will best serve the north-central region of West Virginia as a fully integrated institution . . . We think we can save costs, afford more
construction, and serve students’ needs better” (Kabler, 2006, p. 1C). With the passage of SB 792 (2006), the schools were reunited on July 1, 2006 with the CTC renamed as Pierpont Community and Technical College as a division of Fairmont State University. The new name was not sought by either side of Fairmont State, as one administrator recalled: “That was not in the original bill that Senator Prezioso introduced. It was one of those political things that happened and we’re very pragmatic here. You can call us whatever you want, just give us the money.”

The sharing of resources by the four-year institution and the CTC has created difficulties as well. One administrator explained, “[We] started seeing people acting territorial within both of our organizations. They didn’t want to share. They wanted their own this and their own that. And we could just see things spiraling out of control in terms of costs because we were setting up separate organizations to do the same thing.” The sharing of resources required faculty to be allocated to one institution or the other. This depended upon where the faculty member performed the bulk of his or her teaching (Hunt, 2005a).

The CTC was also required to pay the four-year institution for support services based on annualized full time equivalent (AFTE) students through the “chargeback model” (Hunt, 2005a). Most institutions were able to agree upon their specific “chargeback model,” however, there were issues between West Virginia State University and West Virginia State Community and Technical College. The disagreements at WV State centered around three issues: a) “verification of previous year’s revenue and expenditures,” b) “splitting of assets between the two entities,” and c) “differences concerning what community and technical colleges need” (Hunt, 2005b, p. 2). The WV
Council on Community and Technical Education approved a recommendation to hire an outside firm to aid the two institutions to develop an acceptable “chargeback model” (Hunt, 2005b). While the other institutions agreed on chargeback agreements in June and July 2005, West Virginia State and its administratively linked CTC were not able to agree until six months later with the CTC contributing $3.1 million for the 2005-2006 academic year to WV State University (Griffin, 2006).

Another issue regarding funding was the fluidity of enrollments across both institutions. This fluctuation caused concern because the chargeback rates were based on a predicted enrollment ratio for the CTC and its administratively linked former parent. One administrator explained,

> Numbers have moved back and forth. One thing we tried to do here is to keep enrollment balanced. The way they worked the system [and] the way the legislation is written [is] if both units don’t grow and shrink at the same rate, you’re shifting overhead from one to the other. And so, we’ve done our best to maintain enrollment balance. It’s been 1/3:2/3 [CTC/four-year] here for a long time – so our goal is to keep it 1/3:2/3 at least until the appropriation is enrollment based. If a student moves from the community college to the university or vice versa, their tuition moves, but the state appropriation stays where it was and so it means the campus whose overhead costs go up is not the campus that’s got the money or the institution that’s got the money.

Of the four universities in this study involved in the CTC separation, Shepherd experienced the least intrusive transition. This was based partially on a smaller number of
students lost to the CTC and based partially on Shepherd’s willingness to aid the CTC in the move to independence. While there is a perception among other institutions’ administrators that Shepherd wanted to be rid of their CTC, one administrator clarified the situation:

The legislature actually made that decision, Shepherd didn’t. We didn’t throw them out. We did help them get relocated to Martinsburg. We did help them to get to be a more independent unit of Shepherd. And we recognized that if we made them more independent enough, they would be sitting out there ripe for separation. You’re right, I always believed that it would not be bad for Shepherd or for the Community College [if it left Shepherd] . . . Now that our Community College is gone and is in Martinsburg, they now can focus and promote themselves as [providing] work force development at the associate’s degree level. They can do certification, certificate programs, [and] continuing education. They know exactly what they’re about and everyone’s aware of that. We, on the other hand, are out of that business and can focus on more of the academic side of things, the baccalaureate side, some master’s level, and now we have a clearer sense of what we’re about and what our priorities are and I think we both have benefited.

Although still administratively linked to its former parent, the Community and Technical College of Shepherd widened the chasm when the legislature permitted the school to become Blue Ridge Community and Technical College on July 1, 2006 (SB 792, 2006).
In the same bill that renamed CTC Shepherd as Blue Ridge CTC, the legislature granted Fairmont State University the permission to reabsorb Fairmont State Community and Technical College (SB 792, 2006) on July 1, 2006. Renaming the school as Pierpont Community and Technical College, the division has retained its presidential position while similar changes elsewhere in West Virginia have downgraded the divisional CEO position from president to provost. This occurred when Potomac State College of West Virginia University and WVU Tech both lost regional campus status.

The reunification of Fairmont’s two units was strongly opposed by the West Virginia Council for Community and Technical College Education. WVCCTCE chairman, Nelson Robinson, accused the two Fairmont presidents, Daniel Bradley and Blair Montgomery, of sabotage and that they were “an embarrassment to the community college system” (“FSU hot topic,” 2006 ¶ 6). Chancellor Jim Skidmore expressed concern that if Fairmont were allowed to reabsorb the CTC, the entire community college system would crumble (“FSU hot topic,” 2006). One administrator analyzed the situation:

Fairmont succeeded last year in getting their community college back under their aegis. I looked for pressure this year and it hasn’t happened. I did talk to the people at Glenville and asked them if they were going to make a push to get their community college back . . . Their chairman of the board said no. They thought things were working out for them anyhow even though they’re very, very small without that enrollment. From what I know, it seems to be working OK and it didn’t breakdown. I thought that
would be the crack in the armor when Fairmont got their’s back. But, it hasn’t happened.

Figure 6.6
Fairmont State CTC & Pierpont CTC Signage on I-79 South.

From June 2006 & February 2007 – the old sign remained at least six months after the July 1, 2006 change.

While no other schools have moved for reunification, the issue is being explored at West Virginia State University. During a meeting of the WV State Faculty Senate on December 1, 2006, a motion carried specifying that the institutions explore the possibilities of remerging. They also desired that WV State president Hazo Carter set up an exploratory committee in this regard. The faculty senate concluded that “the split seems to have had negative financial repercussions for both institutions [and] the Faculty Senate should consider taking a position on the remerger issue” (WV State Faculty Senate, 2006, p. 4). The Community & Technology College faculty, however, opposed reunification.

It remains to be seen whether other schools will follow Fairmont State’s lead for reunification. The impact of the creation of six (now five) new institutions will emerge in time. One administrator recognized the limitations of the current situation:
I think it failed. Not that it had to fail, but in a state with no money, it was bound to fail. You’ve got Marshall. It probably didn’t have much effect on Marshall, although the community college had to go its own way. Ultimately, its costs are going to go up. West Virginia State is struggling, both parts of it. Bluefield: both parts of Bluefield are struggling because they just increased the overhead. If you look the per FTE costs of institutions, there’s a huge difference between an institution of two to three thousand and an institution of five to six thousand. There’s a real economy of scale as you get bigger. And all we did was create a whole bunch of small colleges . . . If we were a rich state, we could have 20 presidents and have good institutions, but we’re not a rich state and it’s always going to be true you can save money by sharing overhead costs.

**West Virginia “College-to-University” Institutions and Enrollment**

Fourteen West Virginia administrators were interviewed regarding the changes at their respective schools; however, very few were willing to conclude that the addition of the university name was the major factor in enrollment growth. While some schools indicated that it had a positive effect, others based growth on conditions that were in motion prior to the name change. As a whole, West Virginia’s regionally accredited schools saw an increase in enrollment since 2001 (see Appendix H). One administrator characterized the sources of that growth:

The enrollment increase in the public institutions has come from two places: one, the recruitment of out-of-state students; and two, the offering
of dual enrollment courses in high school. And that’s a substantial part of the enrollment of community colleges. My concern with those dual enrollments, because of accreditation . . . is that the publics are required to take those credits and I’m concerned that there are not the quality controls in place . . . The dual enrollment grew exponentially over several years [but] it has begun to level off.

Figure 6.7
With the exception of a few institutions, enrollments at the rebranded universities were flat; additionally, some decreased because of the community and technical college bifurcation (see Figure 6.7). This section will address enrollment at the 10 institutions that became universities. This will be based upon the various needs that prompted the change. More emphasis will be given to those institutions that were identified as “survival” schools because their situations are more complex than the other seven institutions.

Schools with the Need to Survive

In Chapter Two, three institutions were characterized as becoming universities to fulfill a survival need. All three, The University of Charleston, Salem International University, and West Virginia University Institute of Technology, have had difficult years following their name changes. While each experienced diminishing enrollments, all three schools appear to be on firmer footing in 2007 than in previous years.

The University of Charleston. The University of Charleston (UC) enjoyed a period of large enrollments in the five years following the name change in 1979; however, it has not be able to sustain those student numbers. Currently, the school serves fewer than half of the students that it did in the early 1980s. While enrollments have flattened in the last five years, UC experienced the worst student graduation (persistence) record in the entire state. In 2006, UC conferred 113 fewer degrees than it did in 2002 (see Table 6.9). This computes to an overall loss of 43.46%. Not only does this figure constitute the greatest percentage of loss in West Virginia, it is nearly double the loss of the second worst record, a loss of 57 graduates that both Glenville and West Liberty equally experienced during the same period (WVHEPC, 2006).
Table 6.9  
*Degrees conferred by The University of Charleston; (WVHEPC, 2006).*

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>260</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>147</td>
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Table 6.10  
*UC Undergraduate Tuition & Fees; (HEP Directories, 2002-2006).*

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$14,900.00</td>
<td>$16,500.00</td>
<td>$17,400.00</td>
<td>$19,900.00</td>
<td>$20,200.00</td>
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Even though graduation numbers are down, The University of Charleston has the appearance of a thriving and vital institution. While UC’s reputation will be addressed in a subsequent chapter, part of this perception may be attributed to the school’s annual tuition and fees. In academic year 2006-07, UC had one of the state’s highest annual undergraduate tuition and fees at $21,000. In 2006-2007, only two West Virginia institutions surpassed UC in costs: West Virginia Wesleyan College at $21,300 and Wheeling Jesuit University at $22,810 (Burke, 2006). By the 2007-2008 academic year, UC had the second highest tuition in the state at $22,050 behind Wheeling Jesuit’s rate of $23,490 (Burke, 2007). Between 2001-02 and 2005-06, The University of Charleston had a steady increase in tuition with the largest rise (14.3%) occurring during 2004-05 and a mean increase of 8% (see Table 6.10).

To combat students’ inability to pay high tuition rates, UC instituted a grant program in 2005. Hoping to generate an additional 200 full-time students, scholars from Kanawha and its adjacent counties were guaranteed $7,000 in tuition assistance. An additional grant of $1,500 was provided to these same students who lived in campus housing (“UC to Streamline,” 2005).
Table 6.11
Correlation of UC conferred degrees (graduates) and undergraduate tuition & fees.

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<tr>
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<th>Graduates</th>
<th>Tuition</th>
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<tr>
<td>Pearson</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-.988(**)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>5</td>
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Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Figure 6.8
Correlation scatter plot of UC conferred degrees and undergraduate tuition & fees.

Although the tuition rate of growth in the past several years is lower than the 20% increases in the 1970s, there appears to be a relationship between a rise in tuition and fees and the drop in the overall number of graduates. The Pearson bivariate correlation coefficient indicated an extremely high correlation between the rise in tuition and the
decrease in the number of degrees awarded (see Table 6.11 and Figure 6.8). This negative correlation was calculated with an r of -0.002.

Even with diminishing persistence rates, The University of Charleston reported in fall 2006 its highest fulltime enrollment (1003) since 1986. In addition, student retention rates have increased over the past three years. For the 2006-07 academic year, UC experienced a retention rate of 82%. Retention in 2004-05 was at 68% and at 74.5% in 2005-06 (Karmasek, 2006). Although full-time enrollment was up, 2004-05 figures indicated that the school steadily decreased in part-time enrollment with a 75% loss over 15 years (“UC to Streamline,” 2005). While the current full-time enrollment figures do not represent the 79 graduate students in the Doctor of Pharmacy (Pharm.D.) program, the estimated 100 undergraduate students enrolled in the pre-pharmacy program are considered the major contributor to the 2006-07 increase (Karmasek, 2006).

While UC has been successful in attracting students to its new pharmacy school, its administration also realized that several undergraduate programs in 2005 were not fiscally sound. Because of diminished enrollment, programs in theatre, art education, and music education were completely eliminated. Additionally, several departments were also consolidated to cut costs. History and political science combined to create the public policy department. English and mass communication unified as a single communications department. The departments of information technology and computer information systems also became a single entity. These programmatic cuts and consolidations also resulted in the elimination of some faculty positions. In addition, UC planned to cut several co-curricular activities including the symphony and chorus (“UC to Streamline,” 2005). Similar to the programmatic alignments and additions experienced at Missouri’s
Truman State University, trimming institutional fat may result in a university with a greater potential for future success.

*Salem-Teikyo University (now Salem International University).* Saved from closure by Salem College’s alignment with Japan’s Teikyo University, Salem-Teikyo University experienced sustainable growth during the first five years of its new iteration. Part of the school’s success was based upon its parent institution’s inability to serve its students at its multiple locations throughout Japan, as one administrator observed.

At that time in Japan, the demographics were such that only 30 some percent, who wanted to go to a college or university, could be accommodated in Japan itself. Almost 70% had to go somewhere else in the world . . . Teikyo University was able to admit students to Teikyo University with the understanding that their education was going to be at an American institution. They were able to continue their tremendous growth as a university. Now they had a satellite where those students who really wanted a broader international kind of education had a place where they could go that was safe. Their parents could feel that they could send their son or daughter to the United States because they were going to hold Teikyo University responsible for their welfare. They felt that the environment at Salem had to be OK or Salem wouldn’t have made this arrangement with Teikyo or Teikyo with Salem.

This new international market had a profound effect on Salem’s solvency and viability. One administrator reminisced that “obviously it brought a great deal of full tuition income. Secondly, it gave us an identity and we became much more successful in
approaching foundations and corporations for funds to help support a variety of different programs.” The agreement with Salem was positive for Teikyo as well, who expanded into other U.S. markets buying other struggling institutions. Besides Salem-Teikyo, Teikyo University also operated Teikyo Lorretto Heights University in Denver, Teikyo-Westmar University and Teikyo-Marycrest University in Iowa, and Teikyo-Post University in Connecticut. In addition, Teikyo had operations elsewhere in Asia and Europe. This global network provided additional opportunities for Salem-Teikyo students as one administrator recalled.

They [Teikyo University] were international themselves. They had major operations in Tokyo, Seoul, and Taiwan. Here were students coming from Korea, Taiwan, mainland China, and a huge number from Japan. We had people that would be educated in the United States, but who could go to staff many companies’ headquarters or companies’ outlets in the countries from where these people came. The first five years were really exciting. We had foreign study opportunities for our students in Germany and England and in Tokyo. We had sister relationships [that] we had established in Korea with a number of a different universities where again the interchange was possible. The same was true with Taiwan . . . [and] China. So. [we were] focusing on Asia, and then looking at the international corporations who were growing so extensively in that area.

Unfortunately for all of Teikyo’s American operations, the excitement after the first five years diminished. One administrator illustrated how the Teikyo arrangement collapsed.
After that, we got into some difficulty and part of the difficulty was that the bubble burst in Tokyo. The higher education institutions now began to absorb a higher and higher degree of those [students] who wanted to study in Japan. [This was] because so many now were not going into higher education. What happened year by year [is that] the percentage of students that would come from Teikyo diminished because they could be absorbed within the Teikyo system in Japan. Obviously, their [Teikyo’s] first responsibility was to support their [Japanese] higher education [campuses].

Teikyo is an enormous institution with campuses and property values. It’s so widespread. So now, rather than having a excess of students, they had students that . . . could be absorbed by their own campuses. The result was that the steady stream of 200 or so students we had every year coming for four years . . . [and resulted in] 800 full tuition students . . . began to diminish. [Therefore,] the amount of direct income began to fall. As that direct income began to fall, it became increasingly difficult for Teikyo to meet its commitment.

Teikyo’s leaseback commitment (as noted in Chapter Three), which provided for the upkeep of facilities, was being neglected. Another administrator who came to Salem during this period noted that, “the buildings and the dorms were in deplorable shape and nothing was being done to address the situation.” Salem had returned to its state of trying to survive and could not do so alone; as one administrator remarked, “When all of the sudden, when Teikyo could no longer provide the students to make it worthwhile for them, then I thought ‘well here we go again.’” [We] began to look for another partner to
sustain our international mission because, by that time, the Americans students who were coming [to Salem] came because they wanted all the opportunities for international activity, which were quite extensive.”

By fall 1999, Teikyo was only sending 19 Japanese students to Salem (Tuckwiller, 2000a). The situation was mirrored at the other Teikyo affiliates. Iowa’s Teikyo-Westmar University became independent in 1995 as Westmar University and subsequently closed in 1997 (“Statement of Affiliation Status – Westmar,” 2007). The other Iowa affiliate, Teikyo Marycrest University, left the Teikyo fold in 1996 as Marycrest International University and eventually closed in 2002 (“Statement of Affiliation – Marycrest, 2007). In 2004, Connecticut’s Teikyo Post University ceased its affiliation with its Japanese parent and became Post University (“History,” 2007). Only one of the five Teikyo affiliates remains as such: Teikyo Loretto Heights University. The Denver institution has had its difficulties as well. In 2000, officials at Teikyo Loretto Heights University indicated that Japanese enrollment had been cut in half (Tuckwiller, 2000a). Currently the school, which is not regionally accredited, has only 128 students and is leasing space to a number of educational concerns in the Denver region (Burke, 2006; Johnson, 2006).

By fall 2000, Salem’s institutional budget was cut, employees were dismissed, and there was no indication that even 19 students would be coming from Japan. Salem-Teikyo’s financial condition was becoming a concern even for students. One student commented, “There's a lot of buzz, a lot of rumors anyway. More now because of the budget cuts. I have a lot of friends who are very scared and waiting to see what happens. Students are concerned” (McElhinney, 2000). Without the fanfare of the 1989 name
change, Salem dropped the Teikyo brand on October 11, 2000 and rechristened itself as Salem International University (SIU). The decision to remove the Teikyo name was recommended by Teikyo president Shoichi Okinaga (Tuckwiller, 2000b).

During this period, Salem International began shopping for a new partner to sustain the institution. Not limiting their extent to foreign partners, Salem even made overtures to other institutions in West Virginia for help. A Mountain State University administrator recalled, “Governor Cecil Underwood, who was on Salem’s board, contacted us to see if we were interested in taking it over; however, we did not pursue the offer.” One administrator outlined the process of securing a new affiliation. “Actually while we were still associated with Teikyo, we thought that if we are going to look for another partner, then we don’t necessarily want to limit it to Japan . . . .We were looking in China, Taiwan, Singapore, Korea; and we had very possible partners in all of those different places.”

By late June 2001, Salem International University announced their new agreement with Informatics Holding, Ltd. based in Singapore. Informatics, which had computer learning centers and franchises in 30 countries, purchased the school for $1.1 million. The campus was estimated to be worth $7.3 million (“Singapore Firm,” 2001). Another administrator confided, “I was a little taken aback by the amount of money that they took for the sale of the school. I would have thought the school was worth much more than that.”

The situation was different with the new partner who would not be sending students to Salem, but rather working with the institution to grow offerings for online instruction (“Salem Announces,” 2001). Within three years, Informatics Holdings, Ltd.
was in serious financial straights. Informatics reported a net loss of $15.3 million in what was termed as “Singapore's worst accounting scandal.” The corporation admitted, “it overstated sales and profits and understated costs” (“Informatics Holdings,” 2004, M11). With the financial troubles of Informatics, Salem began once again looking for a new partner. In 2005, the Palmer Group and several related companies purchased Salem International University for $1 million and Informatics Holdings agreed to absorb $7.5 million of debt the school accrued in 2003 and 2004 (“Pa. Firm,” 2005; Tuckwiller, 2005).

Led by the former dean of the Wharton School of Business at the University of Pennsylvania, Russell E. Palmer, The Palmer Group has invested in a number of educational institutions that it has subsequently sold (The Palmer Group, 2002). One administrator speculated that will happen with Salem: [They have] “taken the responsibility of buying schools who were in not such good shape and making them for-profit institutions, building them back up, selling them, and making money on them. They are very successful in doing that . . . They are now the people who actually own the campus. It’s no longer a non-profit institution; it’s a for-profit institution and they’ve made a lot of changes.” One of the areas that hasn’t been changed is Salem’s current emphasis on online education. In 2005, the school reported that in had 400 students on campus with an additional 450 students taking classes online (“University Facing,” 2005). SIU’s latest FTE is 944 students and it appears that the institution is recovering from the low enrollments in the late 1990s (Burke, 2006).

A 2007 development at Salem International University may be a signal that the institution may be considering another name change. On January 18, 2007, SIU
registered the salemu.edu domain and began transitioning from its salemiu.edu domain. Salem International’s Chief Information Officer Pieter B. Bresler explained the change: “The institution’s board of trustees voted on changing the domain. This was part of the institution’s move to update marketing materials and institutional image. The board also wanted to make the domain shorter and American students are more inclined to look for the school at salemu.edu rather than salemiu.edu” (Personal communication, October 5, 2007). Another administrator confessed that, “No official reason has been given for the domain change. The rumor is that a name change is coming and the ‘International’ will be dropped. I’m waiting to see just like everyone else” (Personal communication, October 8, 2007). If the rumor is correct, and it appears likely as Bresler emphasized “American students,” it will be the fourth name change for the school in 20 years.

**West Virginia University Institute of Technology.** During the 10 years since the adoption of the WVU brand, West Virginia University Institute of Technology had diminishing enrollments. One administrator felt that the expectations with the merger did not materialize: “There were some individuals who assumed that the WVU affiliation might result in additional funding to Tech [and] It might result in some kind of surge of enrollment. I believe that, if you look at those two categories, you’ll find that there were some things that did not happen.” Even with the sagging enrollment, WVU Tech is beginning to increase in the number of full time students as another administrator observed:

Tech’s FTE is up and we expect to continue to go forward and to turn around as they get more and more full time students who are into the programs that they have. You know a lot of the colleges don’t tout FTE
because they’ve lost it considerably. Last year, Tech’s FTE was up 6.3% and the Community and Technical College . . . was up 51 students. The head count at Tech was down 4% and 1% in the Community and Technical College . . . FTE is where the money and the work is. FTE has turned around but not headcount.

While enrollment has been down in some areas, there are some growth areas at WVU Tech. In discussing the situation at Tech, one administrator analyzed growth and loss at some other southern West Virginia institutions as a comparison.

You know Marshall’s enrollment has been flat for five years. Mountain State has grown enormously, but if you look inside there are probably some growth elements at Marshall and loss areas at Mountain State. And that’s the way we look at it . . . If [Tech’s] finances were stronger, we would be happier and that’s what we’re addressing: how to get them on a stable financial platform. But I would say that our view of success is mixed and in some areas it’s been successful and some it is not.

One of the growth areas at WVU Tech is a cooperative program with West Virginia University in athletic coaching education. Another administrator explained, [WVU’s] “sports and physical education [department] is delivering the athletic coaching education program down there on that campus and it has been tremendously popular. So, that’s worked very well and they seemed to welcome that with open arms. A lot of it blurs, it’s not a crisp line of what’s WVU Tech and what’s WVU. There is some pushing of the boundaries a little bit.” Other programs are doing well, as one administrator
observed: “Nursing has been very successful. We actually shut down a Charleston program and moved it to Tech.”

In addition, there was a fear that WVU would close the engineering program at Tech. These fears were compounded in 2006 when Governor Manchin announced that Tech’s engineering program would be relocated to South Charleston – a move that, as Chapter Four indicated, did not happen.

In actuality, WVU has been supplementing engineering enrollments at Montgomery, as one administrator explained.

So there were people [who] thought that maybe we [WVU] were trying to . . . get quote engineering to Morgantown. In fact, the opposite is true. Our engineering is growing so fast that we’re sending students down there that we could not educate up here because we don’t have room for them. People were fearful that we would suck all of the engineering students up here. So that misinformation [is] typical merger stuff. The change in culture, loss of culture, lack of money, fear of the unknown – all of these different things go through any merger in any organization: hospitals, businesses, whatever. [Those attitudes] floated through there [at WVU Tech] for a 10-year period.

On July 1, 2007, West Virginia University Institute of Technology changed status from a regional campus of WVU to divisional status (HB 4690, 2006). In 2005, Potomac State College of West Virginia University moved from a regional campus status to a divisional status (HB 2224, 2003). WVU is anticipating that the switch at WVU Tech
will garner similar growth in enrollment as experienced in Keyser, as one administrator noted: “Potomac State has grown like a weed. Since last year [2005-06], [they have increased] 12% in FTE and 13% in headcount. I mean, numbers don’t lie.” Another administrator added, “they’re [Potomac State] really having to look at controlling the enrollment for the fall ‘07. Even with the new residence hall going in, if they don’t do something to cut that back some, they won’t be able to accommodate the students. They have just taken off.”

If the divisional model used at Potomac State has the same effect at Tech, WVU expects to move Tech’s service area beyond its current region. One administrator deduced, “It may be as much as anything that their base is just evaporating from underneath them and they may not have done as much in the last couple of years as they could have to expand their reputation beyond the region. I think that what you’re going to be seeing now is that they will probably be putting more energy in projecting themselves beyond those immediate 18 counties to try to attract students.”

**Schools with the Need for Security**

In Chapter Two, institutions with the Malsowian need of safety or security were characterized as having moved beyond the survival level. While survival was no longer an issue, these institutions are moving toward the next level. In regard to this study, the archetype of “universities” fulfilling security needs are those that have adopted the university moniker not as a reflection of what they are, but rather what they will become. One institution in this study is at this level: Ohio Valley University.
Ohio Valley University. While Ohio Valley University (OVU) is the most recent college to become a university, one may be hesitant to attribute growth to this phenomenon after only two academic years. However, OVU’s administration is confident that the new name is driving institutional growth and high retention rates. One administrator explained, “Basically we’re up 20%. We are in the largest spring [2007] enrollment that we had right now. I’ll tell you something else, I think it’s a direct relationship . . . our retention numbers this spring are 91% for freshman and 93% overall. Nobody’s going to stop that. [Our] retention is off the charts. The same thing [occurred] last year.”

In addition to the name change, the large spring 2007 enrollment may also be the result of OVU’s working harder to fill seats. Another administrator reflected, “We just busted our tail this spring semester trying to get transfer students in; we had a big transfer student program. We have some adult learning, adult ed. classes . . . [and] all those cohorts are full.” Part of OVU’s success is related to their association with other institutions. An OVU administrator explained their partnership with an institution across the Ohio River in Washington County, Ohio.

We recruit heavily from Washington State Community College. That’s a big partner of ours . . . A lot of the students that Washington State brings though the doors are a natural fit to Ohio Valley as far as socioeconomic background, student profile, grade point, and that type of thing. It’s a two-plus-two program . . . We’ve really done a lot in the past few years to draw back and concentrate more on our efforts in the local area of a 60-to-100 mile radius. There’s a great student pool here; and as far as faith based
universities, if you want to stay home and go to a faith based university, we’re the only game in town.

_Schools with the Need for Status_

In Chapter Two, several institutions were identified as converting from a college to a university in order to increase their status. These institutions, as Tuzzolino & Armandi (1981) categorized businesses, are poised for leadership, have attained a certain market share, and have an established image. The six West Virginia schools in this category are Wheeling Jesuit University, Mountain State University, Concord University, Fairmont State University, Shepherd University, and West Virginia State University.

_Wheeling Jesuit University._ The success at Wheeling Jesuit University (WJU) is multifaceted and will be addressed fully in a subsequent chapter. One aspect that drove both the name change to Wheeling Jesuit College and later to Wheeling Jesuit University was part of the institution’s master plan to gain new students. One administrator reflected on the results.

The initial intention [of the name change] was to increase enrollment, and obviously with that increase in enrollment, I had a balanced budget. Only the first year or two, I didn’t have a balanced budget because I was trying to dig out from what was left to me. Ever since then, we had a balanced budget . . . Part of that [was] through the enrollment. The whole concept of changing to Wheeling Jesuit College and then to Wheeling Jesuit University was to attract more students. I think in that sense it has an attractive feature – it’s a university.
In addition to a quantity of students, enrollment can be measured on the quality of its student body. Another administrator characterized the type of student that attends WJU. “They attract a lot of very highly driven individuals. They . . . [have] Type A personalities . . . As much as they say ‘we can make you a leader or follower,’ those [types of] schools are after leaders, because they want people to leave there being highly successful and to make a name for themselves.”

**Mountain State University.** For Mountain State University (MSU), the institution more than doubled its enrollment in the years since changing from The College of West Virginia. In addition, the school experienced over 172% increase in the number of graduates that it produced from 2002 to 2006 (see Figure 6.9). In 2002, MSU conferred 369 degrees. In contrast, MSU awarded 1005 degrees in 2006 (WVHEPC, 2006).

Of all four-year institutions in West Virginia, MSU experienced the greatest percentage of student persistence during this five-year period. The only institutions that surpassed this percentage were two community and technical colleges that had a relatively small number of graduates in 2001-02. Eastern WV CTC had 1 graduate in 2002, but had 19 in 2006 that resulted in a growth rate of 1800%. Marshall CTC grew from 15 to 41 graduates and experienced a 173.33% of growth (WVHEPC, 2006).

While there is a hesitation to credit the Mountain State brand as the primary reason for the school’s growth, one administrator acknowledged its importance in allowing the institution to move into new markets.

I couldn’t tell you the issue of selling of a product over that period primarily occurred as the benefit of MSU as a name . . . [however,] looking at growth from a sales standpoint, I would say that has been
singly the greatest benefit. But with those sales, goes the opportunity to network and to integrate the institution into a larger environment and I don’t believe you can get into that larger environment without having an appropriate brand. It’s kind of like trying to sell “oat bran” as opposed to “Cherrios.” The brand is going to carry you a long way. We’re just really, really new. We’re an infant in this business here as far as independent, online, and nontraditional education. Although we’ve been doing it for years, we are a new player. I don’t think that we could have been the player that we are now or hope to be in the future without riding on a good brand and Mountain State University is a good brand.

Figure 6.9
*Degrees conferred at the new universities.*
**Concord University.** Concord University, which was less reliant upon the new name than the three other sister institutions, admits that the change had little or no effect on enrollment. The administration acknowledges that other factors may have contributed to overall growth. One of these was the PROMISE Scholarship program. “Yes it helped . . . we already had a fairly substantial scholarship program in place, and frankly . . . it has relieved us of the burden we have because we do get a substantial number of PROMISE scholars.” While the PROMISE program may have contributed a number of students to Concord, one administrator felt that these students would have probably attended Concord if the program were not available.

In a study I read last week, 97 or 98% of those students would go to school anyway . . . Those were people who were already coming. I do think, as it did in Georgia [with the HOPE Scholarship], that [PROMISE] enabled WVU to recruit students that would have gone to the regional colleges . . . After Marshall, WVU, and Fairmont State’s Community College, we have more PROMISE scholars than any other institution. I think that those are people who we were already getting.

This reasoning is consistent with a study conducted on the behalf of the West Virginia Higher Education Policy Commission. According to Nicholson, “A full 97% of the survey respondents reported that they would still have attended college without the scholarship, which suggests that the impact of PROMISE on increasing postsecondary attendance may not be as strong as was hoped” (2006, pp. 71-72). In addition, Nicholson reported that “70% reported that PROMISE was either a ‘fair’ or the ‘primary’ factor in their [students] decision to stay in West Virginia for college, but 71% also responded
‘yes’ when asked whether they would have remained in state in for college even if they
had not received the scholarship” (2006, p. 71).

In addition, Concord’s enrollment was related to the increase in community and
technical college education in West Virginia. One administrator mused, “I do think that
there’s been a change. One of the things that we thought would end up happening would
be that there would be a shift with the new community colleges in West Virginia; that
some of the students we had been taking would probably end up going the community
colleges and we would replace those students with graduate students. And to a certain
extent, that has happened.” While related to the “college-to-university” change, one
administrator predicted that the foray into graduate education would become a significant
portion of Concord’s enrollment. These new programs will be strategically planned and
will be funded through alternative sources.

We are offering a program in education, but we will offer others. But, we
are not going to do it in a slap bash, haphazard way. We are going to offer
solid programs to meet the real learning needs of people. I think that [if]
you look at where this institution will be 15 years from now, I would guess
that somewhere in the neighborhood of 15 to 20% of our enrollment would
be at the graduate level. But, it’s in areas [that will] require resources . . .
Have those resources been provided? No, and we don’t expect any help
from the state government to do the master’s programs. In fact, they’ve
made it clear they would not provide resources for us to move to another
level . . . . When there’s genuine demand, private resources will become
available even when you’re a public institution.
**Fairmont State University.** Fairmont State (FSU), which has had significant growth even without name change, believes that the name change has had minimal effect on enrollment. One administrator explained, “I doubt locally it makes much difference . . . . The community is happy with it, but how we’re viewed by students in high schools, at least in the short term, I don’t think has changed. If a student is looking at us, West Liberty, and Glenville, the fact that we had our name changed to university is probably not going to be a very big factor in the decision of the student.”

Although the name change may not have had an impact upon local enrollment, one administrator indicated that it might have contributed to a greater presence outside of the state. “We think so [that it has increased marketing share elsewhere]. You know it’s hard to quantify those sorts of things.” Quantifiable or not, Fairmont State University remains the third largest public institution in West Virginia behind WVU and Marshall.

Its aggressive movement in developing new graduate programs should only spur more growth. Currently, FSU is approved by the North Central Association to offer the following graduate programs: Master of Business Administration, Master of Education, Master of Arts in Teaching, and the Master of Science in Criminal Justice (“Statement of Affiliation – Fairmont,” 2006). In addition, a Master of Science in Nursing is offered in cooperation with Marshall University (“Graduate Degree Programs,” 2007). One administrator expressed that the current offerings are only a beginning. “We’ll be adding graduate programs. We expect to grow. This area is doing fairly well economically relative to the state as a whole. We’re particularly looking for growth in the computer, IT [information technology] and IS [information systems] areas.”
Shepherd University. Like Fairmont State, Shepherd was in a growth period prior to the name change. While the loss of the Community and Technical College had some impact upon Shepherd’s overall numbers, the effect was minimal. Of the new public universities, Shepherd has advanced its number of graduate offerings with sister institution Fairmont State right behind.

Currently Shepherd is approved by the North Central Association to offer the following five master’s degrees: Master of Arts in Curriculum and Instruction, Master of Arts in Teaching, Master of Music Education, Master of Business Administration, and the Master in College Student Development and Administration (“Statement of Affiliation – Shepherd,” 2007). One administrator explained that newer graduate offerings at Shepherd will be geared to its specific service area population.

We’re trying to create a diverse set of offerings and of course need some that are big draws. Our MBA program is a big draw. We’re trying to do some others that the community can benefit from and we recognize that they may or may not have large numbers, but we want to try them anyway. We’re working on one which would be a master’s in public history and it would have a component that would deal with archaeology and preservation. And that’s a big thing around here. Most of Shepherdstown predates the Civil War and there’s a lot of old log cabins and a lot of preservationists in the area. And a lot of the park service folks and we have a good park service presence with Antietam and Harpers Ferry. And those people have an interest in this degree and so we thought a public history degree would be different. We also have the Robert C. Byrd
Center for Legislative Studies here and, of course, that ties in with public history. Because we’re going to become the library which will give you a lot of public history of the U.S. Congress with Senator Byrd’s papers. So, that’s one. I don’t know of anyone else in the region who has a public history degree . . . . That gives you a sense . . . It’s not just the high enrollment ones, which were tempting, but our faculty and administration together wanted to create programs that mirror the interests of the community.

**West Virginia State University.** At the time of the name change, West Virginia State was the only one of the four sister institutions with approval for two graduate degrees: microbiology and media studies. While the name change has had a greater impact upon funding opportunities for WV State, there was a positive effect upon applications from new markets. One administrator elucidated, “I believe we started getting applications from states we had not seen applications for. When we received applications, the person didn’t write in ‘oh, it’s because you’re a university.’ But the same time we became a university, then we started getting applications from states that we normally did not have an interest from students.”

**Summary**

A “college-to-university” name change, as indicated with the population of 103 schools, indicated a significant change in enrollment following the adoption of the name “university.” This change, however, did not manifest itself in a positive manner. On average, negative growth or slowed growth occurred. This was especially true among
medium sized institutions (2,000 to 4,999 FTE) and with schools that had a minor-simple name change (just replaced “college” with “university”).

Among the 34 sample schools, a small number indicated that the “college-to-university” change occurred because of a need to increase enrollment. While this was not the primary factor for seeking university status, a majority of the schools indicated that increased enrollments resulted from the rebranding. While many identified increased enrollments as indicator of success of the change, it was not the major predictor of the change’s overall success.

Furthermore, a correlation existed between enrollment and the addition of graduate programs at the sample institutions. Although the results among the population of 103 were different, the majority (75.72%) of the 103 schools experienced enrollment growth. Unfortunately, fewer than half (41.74%) had enrollment at a higher rate than prior to the name change. The majority of the 103 schools either lost students or had stunted growth. Seventy-three percent of the population of 103 schools and 82% of the sample of 34 schools experienced a growth in graduate programs. The results may indicate that enrollment probably increased when new graduate programs were offered.

Outside of medium sized institutions and minor-simple name changes, other variables such as other size categories, other types of name changes, institutional control, Carnegie Classification, and the number of graduate programs did not appear to affect institutional enrollment for the population of 103 schools. As revealed from interviews of administrators and historical data, decisions made at the state level may negatively affect enrollment. This was the case in Georgia with the systemic change from the quarter system to the semester system. In West Virginia, the separation of the community and
technical colleges from their parent institutions reflected a lower overall enrollment number for the four-year parent institutions.

Finally, while West Virginia administrators admitted that the name change to “university” was a positive move and had some impact upon enrollment, the “university” name alone was unable to generate enrollment growth. While factors related to the name change provided growth initially to two of the “survival” schools, this growth was not sustainable. The third “survival” institution did not see similar growth following the name change. While most other West Virginia rebranded institutions have had periods of enrollment growth, this growth was probably related to other factors. Some of these factors may have been in place prior to the name change. Additionally, five of the institutions have not been “universities” for a sufficiently significant amount of time to gauge the impact of the new name.

Although the “university” identification appears to be significant in an institution’s overall market position, other factors or strategies appear necessary to sustain positive enrollment growth. While an increase in enrollment generally occurs with a “college-to-university” name change, one would be wise to follow Koku’s advice regarding strategic name changes. “Using strategic name change as a marketing tool is not a panacea to decreasing enrollment problems, hence higher education administrators who are considering the use of the strategy to boost falling enrollments are advised to proceed with extreme caution” (Koku, 1997, p. 67).